The Strait of Hormuz paradox—When air power fails to secure a waterway, you need "boots in the water"

If the overarching theory of an "all-air" war is flawed, applying it specifically to the security of the Strait of Hormuz is a prescription for global economic paralysis.

The primary mission in the Strait during a conflict is not just destruction of Iranian targets; it is maritime assurance—the continuous flow of commercial shipping.

For decades, military planners have recognized a fundamental reality that the "Hormuz is still an air war" perspective ignores: you cannot assure maritime traffic from 30,000 feet without "boots in the water."

The Iranian asymmetric doctrine: Designed to sideline the USAF

The Strait of Hormuz is approximately 21 miles wide at its narrowest point. Iran’s whole strategy for closing it is optimized precisely to survive an American air campaign and exploit the lack of a U.S. naval presence.

An all-air strategy fails against Iran’s Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) toolkit in several critical ways:

1. The mobility problem: Tracking "ghost" targets

Airpower excels at destroying static, high-value targets (bunkers, leadership, and bases). It struggles significantly against small, decentralized, and mobile ones.

• Iranian solution: The IRGC Navy (IRGCN) does not use large destroyers. It uses thousands of fast attack craft (FAC) armed with rockets, torpedoes, and missiles. These can be dispersed among thousands of islands, inlets, and commercial shipping along Iran's 1,500-mile coastline. To an F-35 pilot, they are indistinguishable from civilian fishing vessels until they attack.

• Why air power fails: A jet flying at Mach 1.5 cannot provide persistent "loitering" surveillance over thousands of small targets simultaneously. Before an air strike can be coordinated, the attack on a tanker is often already over.

2. The persistence problem: Mines cannot be "bombed" out of existence

The cheapest, most effective way for Iran to close the Strait is sea mines. Modern mines are smart, "stealthy," and can be laid rapidly by everything from specialized vessels to commercial dhows.

• Why air power fails: Mine countermeasures (MCM) are inherently a multi-domain, painfully slow naval operation. An air force has zero capability to detect, classify, or neutralize a mine laid on the seabed. While airstrikes could target minelaying vessels or port facilities, they cannot remove the thousands of lethal mines already in the water.

• The sidelined Navy paradox: In an all-air scenario, the Strait remains effectively closed even if the USAF destroys 100% of Iran's air defense, because nothing has been done to clear the water.

3. The escort problem: Protecting a "non-target"

A military victory means nothing if the commercial world refuses to participate. Global shipping companies and insurers will not send their vessels into a war zone based on vague promises of "overwatch."

• Why air power fails: An F-22 Raptor cannot provide a physical escort. It cannot hail a suspect dhow, board a hijacked tanker, or provide immediate close-in defense against a suicide swarm of FAC. Maritime assurance requires visible, physical naval assets (destroyers and frigates) traveling alongside convoys—the very "Navy" the strategy has sidelined.

• Historical case study: The failure of airstrikes to assure shipping

• To believe that air power can police a major waterway is to ignore the primary lesson of the last major "Tanker War."

Conflict: The Tanker War (1980–1988)	Lessons for Today’s "All-Air" Advocates
Context	During the Iran-Iraq War, both sides launched sustained air attacks against each other's oil facilities and oil tankers in the Persian Gulf to cripple their economies.
The failure of airstrikes	Despite years of intensive bombing by both Iraqi (often using French-made Exocet missiles) and Iranian air forces, they failed to stop the flow of oil or force a surrender.
The cost	The result was not stability, but a chaotic, endless escalation where over 540 commercial ships were attacked, hundreds of mariners killed, and global insurance rates skyrocketed.
How It was "solved" (Operation Earnest Will)	Shipping was only assured when the U.S. Navy stepped in physically. They reflagged Kuwaiti tankers as American vessels and provided direct, armed naval escorts to guide them through the Gulf. High-altitude overwatch was useless; destroyers on the water were required.

Conclusion: The critical vulnerability

By adopting a "Hormuz is still an air war" stance that explicitly sidelines the Navy, the Commander-in-Chief creates a massive vulnerability for the world’s economy. This perspective seeks the perceived safety of distance but sacrifices operational success.

Ignoring the professional military advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the Strait of Hormuz is not a "bold strategic innovation"; it is a bet against a century of naval warfare doctrine and physical reality. An all-air campaign can punish Iran, but it cannot open the water. Without a U.S. Navy on the water, the ultimate strategic victory goes to the side that has successfully used asymmetric warfare to hold the world’s economy hostage.

Related article: The limits of air power: a critical warning to a commander-in-chief without boots on the ground