Limits of airpower - Why regime change in Iran remains unlikely despite decapitation strikes

The geopolitical landscape of the Middle East shifted violently on February 28, 2026, following a massive joint military operation by U.S. and Israeli forces against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

While President Donald Trump has confirmed the death of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei during "major combat operations," the administration’s apparent goal of regime change faces significant structural and historical hurdles.

The strategy of command and control

The opening phase of the campaign mirrors the "time-honored" U.S. doctrine of dismantling the "nerve centers" of an adversary’s military. By targeting the residence of the supreme leader and high-level communication hubs, the coalition seeks to paralyze the Iranian leadership’s ability to coordinate a response. However, decapitation strikes rarely lead to the immediate collapse of a state apparatus, especially one as entrenched as Tehran’s.

The fallacy of popular uprising

President Trump has publicly called for the Iranian people to overthrow their government, but historical precedents suggest this is an optimistic calculation. There are two primary barriers to a civilian-led revolution in this context:

1. Asymmetric Power: It is historically difficult for an unarmed population to dismantle a domestic security state that retains a monopoly on violence.

2. The Ghost of 1991: Regional memory is long. During the Gulf War, the U.S. encouraged an Iraqi uprising against Saddam Hussein, only to withdraw support before reaching Baghdad. This perceived betrayal remains a cautionary tale for dissidents in neighboring countries.

The absence of a ground invasion

Despite the intensity of the air campaign, the deployment of significant ground forces (10,000–20,000 troops) remains highly improbable. For the Trump administration, the risks of a full-scale land war—including massive casualties and unpredictable regional escalation—outweigh the benefits.

The president's historical preference for "controlled chaos" favors surgical strikes and small special operations over the quagmire of long-term occupation. In his view, war is "too much chaos," making the ultimate return on investment impossible to guarantee.

Potential successors and the "Venezuela model"

If the top tier of the Iranian clergy is successfully removed, the resulting power vacuum is unlikely to be filled by liberal reformers. Instead, the most organized and armed institution—the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)—is the most probable successor.

This mirrors the outcome in Venezuela, where U.S. pressure did not install the opposition leader but rather consolidated power under the old regime’s vice president, Delcy Rodríguez. A military-led "revolutionary" government in Iran might eventually negotiate out of pragmatism, but their core identity as "true believers" makes them a volatile partner for the West.

The "humanitarian" justification

The timing of this intervention appears linked to the Iranian government’s recent domestic crackdowns. With an estimated 10,000 to 15,000 protesters killed by state forces in recent months, the U.S. is using human rights as a "fig leaf" for military intervention.

By framing the strikes as a defense of the Iranian people against their own "street killers," the administration hopes to mitigate international backlash and domestic criticism.

However, as the bombs continue to fall, the "rally around the flag" effect remains a potent force that could inadvertently strengthen the very regime the U.S. seeks to dismantle.