The U.S. can’t fight two wars in East Asia — And should stop pretending it can

The U.S. and its allies aren't truly prepared to fight two wars at the same time in East Asia — yet we keep acting like we are. A recent report by the Atlantic Council, A Rising Nuclear Double-Threat in East Asia, urges major changes to how the U.S. handles possible conflicts with both China and North Korea at once.

While these discussions are important, the reality is simple: the U.S. military isn’t ready for two simultaneous wars — and we need to stop planning as if it is.

The harsh reality: We don’t have enough firepower

One key suggestion from the report is for the U.S. to change its global military command structure to better manage wars in both Korea and near Taiwan at the same time. But this idea assumes the U.S. has enough resources — and we don’t.

Our defense industry can’t quickly replace key weapons like missiles and interceptors. In just one conflict, like a war with North Korea, we would burn through these supplies fast. If a second conflict with China breaks out, the U.S. military could run out of critical weapons and face serious setbacks.

A better strategy: Focus on one war at a time

Instead of planning to fight two major wars at once, the U.S. should prepare to prioritize one conflict while holding the line in the other. This strategy — called sequenced escalation — would allow us to apply full force where it’s needed first, then shift focus once allies or reinforcements are ready.

This means:

• Placing key military systems like THAAD and HIMARS in South Korea to deter North Korea.

• Staying intentionally vague about how we’d respond to a Taiwan crisis, to keep China guessing and delay their actions.

• Giving allies time to get organized before fully joining a conflict.

Alliances matter — But we can’t expect perfection

The report also calls for better coordination between the U.S., South Korea, and Japan, including new agreements made in 2023. These are helpful, but the tabletop exercises show that problems still exist.

For example:

• South Korea might not allow U.S. forces stationed there to help defend Taiwan.

• Japan might hesitate to get deeply involved if war breaks out on the Korean Peninsula.

There’s no combined command between the three countries. They also still struggle to fully share intelligence or coordinate missile defenses. In short, assuming smooth teamwork in a crisis is unrealistic.

Instead, the U.S. should aim for flexible coordination rather than total integration.

This means putting U.S. liaison officers in the right places so they can connect different commands quickly during a crisis — without needing controversial or legally difficult agreements.

Rethinking how we deter North Korea

The report discusses the risk of North Korea using nuclear weapons but doesn’t offer strong ideas on how to respond. Relying on small nuclear bombs isn’t ideal — they can cause political problems and may not even work if North Korea’s air defenses stop our planes.

A smarter approach would be to invest in non-nuclear tools like:

• Cyberattacks

• Electronic warfare

• Hypersonic weapons

These tools can strike North Korea’s command systems fast and effectively — without pushing things straight into all-out nuclear war.

Different allies, different roles

South Korea is focused on the North Korean threat. Japan is more concerned about China. Neither wants to get dragged into the other’s war — and that’s okay. We shouldn’t expect our allies to act the same way in every conflict. Instead, we should plan for asymmetric alliance roles:

• South Korea focuses on stopping North Korea.

• Japan helps with intelligence and logistics if there’s a Taiwan crisis.

• Other partners like Australia and the Philippines can secure key sea routes.

• This flexible approach is more realistic and less politically risky for our partners.

Don’t ignore the power of information

The report misses one key area: information warfare. In future conflicts, influencing how leaders in North Korea or China think will be critical.

The U.S. should invest now in:

• External broadcasting

• Online messaging aimed at elite audiences

• Outreach to overseas communities

These tools can help shape decisions and reduce the risk of war — or escalation — by confusing or pressuring enemy leaders in key moments.

Bottom line: Plan for reality, not fantasy

The Guardian Tiger war games are useful — but only if their lessons are grounded in real-world limits.

We can’t assume perfect alliance cooperation, unlimited weapons, or flawless execution. Instead of trying to fight two wars the same way at the same time, the U.S. should:

• Prioritize one war front at a time

• Use modular, flexible alliance coordination

• Prepare for weapon shortages

• Develop non-nuclear strike options

Only by accepting friction and limits can we build a defense strategy that actually works — and avoids costly mistakes.