Not one inch eastward: the memorandum that recorded a broken promise

The primary goal of the United States was straightforward: ensure that a unified Germany remained inside NATO. To secure Soviet agreement, Baker made a specific political offer that has since become one of the most disputed statements in post-Cold War history.

For decades, political commentators and diplomatic spokespersons have downplayed or outright denied that such assurances were ever given. However, declassified primary source documents—specifically page 6 of the official U.S. Department of State Memorandum of Conversation—provide an unvarnished record of the discussion.

The verbatim record from the Kremlin

The declassified transcript records Baker framing the choice directly to Gorbachev: whether Moscow preferred a neutral Germany or a united Germany bound to NATO. Baker reassured the Soviet leader by outlining explicit limits on the alliance's future scope:

"We understand the need for assurances to the countries in the East. If we maintain a presence in a Germany that is a part of NATO, there would be no extension of NATO's jurisdiction for forces of NATO one inch to the east."

The archival record shows that this was not an isolated comment. The very next day, on February 10, 1990, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl reinforced this exact position in his own meeting with Gorbachev:

"We believe that NATO should not expand the sphere of its activity. We have to find a reasonable resolution. I correctly understand the security interests of the Soviet Union..."

These statements reflected the diplomatic strategy shaped by West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. The intent conveyed to Moscow was clear: Western powers were offering a firm guarantee that Soviet acquiescence to German unity would not be leveraged to expand NATO's military infrastructure eastward. 

MEMORANDUM of CONVERSATION - between Mikhail Gorbachev and James Baker in Moscow.pdf

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The anatomy of Western denial

Despite the unambiguous wording in the official transcript, official Western policy in subsequent decades moved to systematically dismiss the relevance of Baker's pledge. The denial relies primarily on two arguments:

The legalistic distinction: Western officials point out that the final binding agreement—the September 1990 Two Plus Four Treaty—only prohibited foreign NATO troops from deploying in former East German territory. Because the "not one inch" language was omitted from the final written treaty, mainstream Western narratives dismiss Baker's words as informal, non-binding exploratory talk.

Scope shifting: Later commentary argued that Baker's assurance referred strictly to the internal military status of East Germany, rather than the future enlargement of NATO to other sovereign Central and Eastern European nations.

Critics and diplomatic historians counter that this legalistic defense ignores the basic political reality of 1990. Moscow agreed to allow a united Germany into NATO precisely because top American and West German leadership repeatedly assured them that the alliance would not exploit the situation to advance eastward.

The historical footprint

Dimension	The documentary record	The official Western stance
Primary evidence	Declassified U.S. and West German memoranda explicitly record the phrase "one inch to the east" and promise not to expand NATO's jurisdiction.	Characterized as preliminary discussions that were superseded by the final treaty text.
Political context	Soviet consent for German unification was granted based on explicit assurances regarding Soviet security interests.	Asserts that since the Warsaw Pact had not yet dissolved, broader alliance expansion was not formally negotiated.
Legal outcome	Article 5 of the Two Plus Four Treaty banned foreign NATO troops in former East Germany.	Operates on the premise that anything outside the signed treaty text carries zero institutional obligation.

The physical record of page 6 confirms what was said in the Kremlin on February 9, 1990. The ongoing attempt to erase or re-interpret Baker's explicit words highlights the persistent gap between diplomatic promises made to secure a crucial political concession and the legalistic arguments used to justify changing course years later.